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Abstract
Transboundary animal diseases can have very severe socio-economic impacts when introduced into new regions. The
history of disease incursions into the European Union suggests that initial outbreaks were often initiated by illegal
importation of meat and derived products. The European Union would benefit from decision-support tools to evaluate the
risk of disease introduction caused by illegal imports in order to inform its surveillance strategy. However, due to the
difficulty in quantifying illegal movements of animal products, very few studies of this type have been conducted. Using
African swine fever as an example, this work presents a novel risk assessment framework for disease introduction into the
European Union through illegal importation of meat and products. It uses a semi-quantitative approach based on factors
that likely influence the likelihood of release of contaminated smuggled meat and products, and subsequent exposure of
the susceptible population. The results suggest that the European Union is at non-negligible risk of African swine fever
introduction through illegal importation of pork and products. On a relative risk scale with six categories from negligible to
very high, five European Union countries were estimated at high (France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom) or moderate
(Spain) risk of African swine fever release, five countries were at high risk of exposure if African swine fever were released
(France, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain) and ten countries had a moderate exposure risk (Austria, Bulgaria, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom). The approach presented here and results
obtained for African swine fever provide a basis for the enhancement of risk-based surveillance systems and disease
prevention programmes in the European Union.
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Introduction
Transboundary animal diseases (TADs) are diseases with a high
potential for spread between countries and of economic, trade and
food safety/security importance [1]. Therefore, disease-free
countries have developed surveillance programmes to prevent or
reduce the risk of disease introduction. Nevertheless, several
countries have reported outbreaks of exotic diseases in the past few
years [2], and illegal imports have often been shown or suspected
to be the cause of primary outbreaks of TADs in countries. In this
paper, illegal import(ation) refers to prohibited commodities that
are brought in from a foreign country either for personal
consumption or for use in trade.
A review by Pharo [3] indicates that foot-and-mouth disease
(FMD) incursions into Taiwan in 1997 and United Kingdom in
1967 and 2001 were suspected of being caused by smuggling of
meat or meat products. Similarly, the outbreaks of classical swine
fever (CSF) in the early 2000 s in several countries of the
European Union (EU) were most likely due to illegal imports of
pork or pork products followed by illegal feeding of swill to pigs
[4,5]. African swine fever (ASF) is another example of a TAD
which has repeatedly been introduced into free areas via illegal
imports of pork products by tourists or for commercial purposes,
or via the illegal disposal of waste from ships or planes originating
from ASF-affected areas. These sources of infection were
suspected to be the cause of outbreaks in Spain in the 1960 s
[6], in Cuba and Brazil in the 1970 s [7,8], and more recently in
Mauritius in 2007 [9] and the Caucasus in 2007 and 2008 [10,11].
The EU has experienced outbreaks of exotic diseases in the last
few years [2]. One of the reasons for these exotic disease incursions
may be the illegal importation of animals and animal products
from TADs-infected countries, some of them sharing borders with
the EU. In this context, the EU has defined an Animal Health
Strategy [12] with an emphasis on disease prevention and
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enhancement of risk-based surveillance systems. Risk analysis and
simulation modelling are increasingly conducted to assess the risk
of disease introduction into countries and inform surveillance
strategies. However, despite the recognised risk associated with
illegal importation of meat and products for the introduction of
diseases, very few studies have evaluated such risk. The few
published studies that have explicitly considered illegal imports of
meat and derived products to assess the risk of disease introduction
highlighted that the main constraint is the difficulty of quantifying
illegal movements of animals and animal products [13–15].
Consequently, these studies mainly used expert opinion both to
define the different pathways leading to the release of the disease
into a country and exposure of the domestic susceptible
population, and to generate estimates for their corresponding
probabilities of occurrence. For country-specific risk assessments
[13,14], data on customs seizures was sought to evaluate illegal
importation of meat and derived products. However, the
availability of such data is rare and, usually, restricted to relatively
small areas or a few countries.
ASF is a TAD and an OIE notifiable viral pig disease with high
potential for within and between country spread, and for which
control solely relies on drastic and costly sanitary measures due to
the absence of a vaccine or treatment. ASF is present in most
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, in Sardinia, Transcaucasia and
the Russian Federation (RF). The presence of the disease in the RF
constitutes an important threat to the EU as highlighted by
a number of studies [16–20]; proximity and price differences in
live animals and animal products between the RF and the EU may
promote illegal importation of pork and pork products. The
outbreak reported in Ukraine at the time of writing [31st July
2012, 2] further highlights the risk of spread of ASF to the EU.
The objective of this study was to develop a semi-quantitative
risk assessment framework for the introduction of a disease into
EU through illegal importation of meat and products, based on
readily available data and using ASF as an example. Specifically,
the model aimed to estimate the risks of release of African swine
fever virus (ASFV) into the EU via illegal importation of pork and
pork products and subsequent exposure of the domestic pig
population, and to allow the comparison of levels of risk between
EU member states (MS).
Materials and Methods
A release and exposure assessment model was developed to
assess the risk of introduction of ASFV into the EU through the
illegal importation of pork and products, using the same structure
and sources of data for all MS so that levels of risk could be
compared between countries.
In the absence of readily available data on illegal imports,
a semi-quantitative model was developed in Excel 2007 (Microsoft
Corp, Redmond, WA) on the basis of information available in the
literature, publicly-available data, and expert opinion when no
other source of information was identified. The risk was assessed
indirectly using proxy indicators (PI), that is factors that were likely
to influence the risk, and for which data available at the EU scale
were collected in a consistent and regular manner.
Existing risk assessments on illegal imports and current
knowledge on the epidemiology of ASF were used to identify
factors influencing release and exposure of ASF through illegal
imports of pork and products. A total of 14 PI, 11 for release (P1–
P11) and 3 for exposure (P12–P14) were identified (Figures 1 and
2). The release of ASF was assumed to occur via illegal imports for
both personal consumption and commercial purposes (restaurants,
markets, etc.), and PIs were further differentiated according to
their relevance for either of these two mechanisms of introduction
of pork and pork products (Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1). The PIs
for the exposure assessment were identified assuming that once
release via illegal imports occurred, the disease could be trans-
mitted to the domestic pig population via swill feeding, people
acting as fomites, or contact with scavenger animals (including
wild boar) having access to waste or landfill [14] (Table 3 and
Figure 2).
Each of the PIs was weighted to reflect how much it is
considered to influence the risk. The risk of release and exposure
of ASF through illegal importations of pork and pork products was
then calculated for each MS by weighted linear combination of the
PIs’ values and weights.
Estimation of Proxy Indicators’ Weights
The weights of the PIs contributing to risk of release and
exposure were derived from expert opinion, using pair-wise
comparison. This elicitation technique is based on the analytical
hierarchy process [21,22], and is typically used to generate
preferences or relative weights, which are necessary ‘‘when
intangible factors need to be added and multiplied among
themselves and with tangible factors’’ [21] i.e. in the present
study for the weighted linear combination of the PIs’ values and
weights. In addition to the relatively easy implementation and
derivation of relative weights (even in the presence of multiple
criteria to consider), an important advantage of this elicitation
method is that it allows the consistency of elicited weights to be
checked. In contrast, other common elicitation methods such as
Delphi are typically used to generate quantitative estimates on
absolute scales or probabilities (e.g. length of incubation period of
the disease under consideration, concentration of the biological
hazard in the commodities of interest, probability of contact
between herds, etc.) and do not allow for easy assessment of the
internal consistency of experts’ answers.
During the elicitation process, a total of 24 scientists involved in
an EU project on ASF – ASFRISK (EC, FP7-KBBE-2007-1,
Project #211691) initially reviewed the structure of the model and
refined the list of PIs. They then provided their opinion on the
relative contribution of the PIs to the risk considered, using pair-
wise comparison as developed by Saaty [22].
For each level of PIs in Figures 1 and 2, a PI was compared with
every other PI (e.g. illegal imports for personal consumption were
compared with illegal imports for commercial purpose; or distance
to ASF affected countries, number of ports and airports and
number of cross-border points with non-EU countries were
compared with each other). Experts were asked to assign
a preference statement for each PI, based on its relative
importance in influencing the risk of release or exposure when
compared with the other PIs of the same level and accordingly
values were then assigned to each PI [23] (Table 4). The resulting
matrix was reciprocal, so that the pair-wise comparison (a) for PI y
and PI z was ayz = ayz
21, and all of its diagonal elements were
unity, so that ayz = 1 when y = z.
The pair-wise values provided by each individual expert (ayz)
were used to derive a weight for each PI (wy) by taking the
principal eigenvector of the pair-wise comparisons:
ayz~
ayz
P1
y{1
ayz
forallz~1,2 . . . n
wy~a^yz for all y = 1, 2…n
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Then, the overall weight for each PI was calculated as the mean
of the individual weights given by experts. The overall weights of
PIs added up to 1 for each level of PIs.
Obtaining Data for Proxy Indicators
For each of the release PIs, P3–5 and P7–11 (Figure 1), and for
each of the parameters from which the exposure PIs, P12–14 were
derived (Figure 2), internet searches were conducted to obtain
publicly available datasets collected in a consistent way for all EU
MS. Details of the PIs, source of data, assumptions and
uncertainty of the data are shown in Tables S1 and S2. For
several of the release PIs and most of the exposure PIs, Eurostat
[24] provided the most complete data set (P3–5,P7–9 and P12–
P13). ArcGIS 10 (ESRI 2010) was used to generate estimates for
P10 and P11.
There were no estimates available in Eurostat for in- and
outbound tourism from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (see P3
and P4 in Table S1). The numbers of journeys from EU MS to
Georgia were found on the website of the Georgian National
Tourism Agency but no data were found for Armenia or
Azerbaijan, and arrivals from the three countries to EU MS were
also not available.
P14, the area in each country of ‘‘suitable habitats for wild
boar’’ was obtained through spatial analysis using the approach
developed by Bosch et al. [25] based on ‘‘potential resources’’ i.e.
suitable habitats to provide food and/or shelter to wild boars. Any
such areas that did not have non-high-biosecurity farms were then
removed. The area of each country with non-high-biosecurity
farms was determined from data obtained through a questionnaire
sent out to Chief Veterinary Officers and pig or livestock industry
organisations in EU MS. The European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA) definitions of high biosecurity, limited biosecurity and free
range were provided [16] and respondents were asked if there
were any areas of the country where only high biosecurity pigs
were kept, or areas where no domestic pigs were kept. The
questionnaire response rate was 67%, as no response was received
for 9 countries (Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden). For MS with no
response, it was assumed that all areas with wild boar habitat also
had pig farms with limited biosecurity.
In the questionnaire, each country was also asked what
proportion of pig farms were high biosecurity, limited biosecurity
or free range. Comments made by two respondents indicated that
they had used farm size as a proxy for biosecurity level, and two
Figure 1. Structure of the release assessment model. Proxy indicators and their relative weights defined for the assessment of the release of
ASF into EU via illegal importations of pork and pork products.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.g001
Figure 2. Structure of the exposure assessment model. Proxy indicators defined and their relative weights for the assessment of the exposure
of ASF into the European Union via illegal importations of pork and pork products.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.g002
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other countries commented that they did not have data on
biosecurity level and therefore the figures provided were best
guesses. As a result of the uncertainty around the data for the
percentage of pig farms that are non-high-biosecurity (P12), it was
decided to use farm size as a proxy for biosecurity level. Indeed,
previous epidemiological studies found that higher biosecurity was
associated with larger herds [26–28].
For farm size a complete data set was available for all MS from
Eurostat. Using this dataset, various farm sizes were explored
based on number of breeding sows and number of pigs greater
than 20 kg that were not breeding sows. The proportion of
holdings with 100 or more breeding sows and/or 400 or more
other pigs greater than 20 kg seemed to provide a reasonable
estimate for the proportion of high biosecurity farms in a member
state, when compared with the questionnaire responses that had
been received. P12, the proportion of pig farms that are non-high-
biosecurity, was calculated as its complementary proportion.
For some PIs the data from 2010 had a high proportion of
missing values and therefore the most complete recent dataset was
used (Tables S1 and S2). If only one value was available for
another year then this was used, if more than one value was
available for other years then the average of the nearest two values
was used.
Calculating Risk Scores
The models for release and exposure were implemented in
Excel 2007 (Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA). For each PI, natural
breaks [29] were used to categorize the country values into six risk
scores (RS) from 0 to 5 (Table 5). In short, natural breaks
classification is a method that partition data based on natural
groups in their distribution, so that between-groups variance is
maximised and within-groups variance minimised.
The relative risks of release and exposure of ASF through illegal
importation of pork and pork products were then determined for
each MS by weighted linear combination of the PIs’ risk scores for
that country and PIs’ weights. The equations to calculate the
overall release and exposure risk scores for a given MS are given
below:
Table 1. Description of the proxy indicators included in the risk assessment model for ASF release into the EU through illegal
importation of pork and pork products for personal consumption.
Proxy indicator*
Hypothesized relationship with the risk of ASF introduction via illegal import of
pork and pork products
Outbound tourism to ASF affected areas It was expected that the risk of release increases with outbound tourism to ASF affected
areas. This is because people living in an EU country and travelling to affected areas may
bring back ASFV contaminated pork products on their return for their own consumption or
as gifts for relatives/friends
Inbound tourism from ASF affected areas It was assumed that the risk of release increases with inbound tourism from ASF affected
areas. People from affected areas and travelling to an EU country may bring contaminated
pork products with them, for their own consumption during their trip
EU residents from ASF affected areas It was hypothesized that the higher the number of residents from ASF affected areas, the
higher the risk of release. The reason for this is that these people may bring contaminated
pork products with them on their return from visits to their countries
*proxy indicators are factors likely to influence the risk being assessed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.t001
Table 2. Description of the proxy indicators included in the risk assessment model for ASF release into the EU through illegal
importation of pork and pork products for commercial purpose.
Proxy indicator*
Hypothesized relationship with the risk of ASF introduction via illegal
import of pork and pork products
Price of pork It was assumed that the higher the price of pork in an EU country, the higher the
incentive to import meat illegally (as the prospect of benefits increases)
EU residents from ASF affected areas Foreign residents of an EU country were assumed to constitute a clientele for
products from their countries of origin. Residents coming from ASF affected areas
were hence assumed to be consumers of pork and pork products from their
countries, and thus contribute to their risk of illegal imports
Geographical factors Distance to the closest ASF affected area The countries close to ASF affected areas were assumed at higher risk of release by
imports for commercial purpose, as the transport of pork and pork products to these
places would be shorter
Number of ports and airports The risk of release was assumed to increase with the number of entry points (airports,
ports, and road and rail crossings on land borders) into a country
Number of cross-border points with non EU
countries
The risk of release was assumed to increase with the number of entry points (airports,
ports, and road and rail crossings on land borders) into a country
*proxy indicators are factors likely to influence the risk being assessed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.t002
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Overall release risk score:
ORRS
~W1| W3|RSP3ð Þz W4|RSP4ð Þz W5|RSP5ð Þ½ 
zW2|W6| W9|RSP9Þð z W10|RSP10ð Þð Þ½
z W11|RSP11ð ÞÞzW7|RSP7zW8|RSP8
ð1Þ
and
Overall exposure risk score:
OERS~W12|RS12zW13|RS13zW14|RS14 ð2Þ
where RSPx is the MS risk score and Wx is the weight for a given
proxy indicator Px (P1–P14).
The overall risk scores were converted into risk categories
(Table 5) to provide for each MS the relative risk of release of ASF
via illegal importation of pork and pork products, and the relative
risk of exposure if ASF were released.
Sensitivity Analysis
In addition to natural breaks, other methods of determining the
ranges for risk scores were explored: dividing the range of values
into 6 equal bands, dividing the values by percentiles, setting
outlying values to be risk score 0 and 5 and then dividing the
remaining range of values into 4 equal bands or by percentiles.
A sensitivity analysis was performed on PIs’ weights and on the
number of non-high-biosecurity farms [30].
The sensitivity analysis on PIs’ weights was performed using
@RISK 6 (Palisade Corporation, Newfield, NY) in Excel 2007
(Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA). In the sensitivity analysis model
for release and exposure assessment, risk scores were calculated
using random combinations of pairs or triplets of individual
weights given by experts, instead of calculating risk scores using the
overall weight for each PI. The impact of the change in PIs’
weights on the countries’ overall risk scores was assessed after
10,000 iterations.
P12 and P14 had a high level of uncertainty because of the lack
of data on farm biosecurity levels and the use of farm size as
a proxy for biosecurity level. In order to examine the effect of the
uncertainty of P12 and P14, fixed values for the percentage of non-
high-biosecurity farms (0%–100%) were used to calculate P12 and
P14, and the impact on the exposure risk category was assessed.
Results
The weights W1 to W14 obtained from expert opinion elicitation
for the release and exposure proxy indicators are shown in
Figures 1 and 2.
Table 3. Description of the proxy indicators included in the risk assessment model for exposure of the EU domestic pig population
to ASF following its release through illegal importation of pork and pork products.
Proxy indicator*
Hypothesized relationship with the risk of ASF introduction via illegal
import of pork and pork products
Number of workers in livestock sector from ASF affected areas People may expose domestic pigs to ASFV by feeding of waste to pets or backyard
livestock or by acting as fomites, and staff in pig farms are considered at higher risk of
doing so. Residents from ASF affected areas were considered more likely to obtain
and consume illegally imported pork and pork products contaminated with ASFV.
Hence, the proportion of workers in the agricultural sector from ASF affected areas is
expected to increase the risk of exposure of domestic pigs in the case of illegal
imports of pork and pork products
Number of non-high-biosecurity farms It was hypothesised that the risk of exposure increased with decreasing farm
biosecurity. This is because the following events are considered more likely to occur
in non-high-biosecurity farms: swill feeding, contact with people acting as fomites or
with scavenger animals having access to waste/landfill and contaminated with ASFV
Area of country with both wild boar habitat and non-high-biosecurity
farms
It was assumed that the risk of exposure increased with the area of the country
covered with both wild boar habitat and low biosecurity farms. In areas with wild
boars, low biosecurity farms are at higher risk of contact with wild boars having had
access to domestic waste or landfill, and that are either infected or acting as fomites
*proxy indicators are factors likely to influence the risk being assessed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.t003
Table 4. Values and corresponding preference statements
used in the pairwise comparison (Malczewski J (1999) GIS and
Multicriteria Decision Analysis. New York, Chichester: John
Wiley & Sons. 408 p.).
Description of preference statement Corresponding value
Equally important 1
Moderately more important 3
Strongly more important 5
Very strongly more important 7
Extremely more important 9
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.t004
Table 5. Overall risk score values and corresponding risk
categories used for the release and exposure assessment.
Overall Risk score (RS) Value Corresponding risk category
0 Negligible
0,RS#1 Very Low
1,RS#2 Low
2,RS#3 Moderate
3,RS#4 High
4,RS#5 Very High
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.t005
ASFV Introduction into EU via Illegal Trade
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The overall release risk scores obtained from weighted linear
combination are shown in Figure 3. No country fell into the very
high risk category, but for four countries (France, Germany, Italy
and United Kingdom (UK)) the risk was estimated as high and for
Spain the risk of release was moderate. No country had negligible
risk but eight countries had very low risk. The percentage
contribution to the overall release risk score for proxy indicators
P3–5 and P7–11 was based on their respective weights and
equation (1). The percentage contribution was the greatest for P5/
P8 (40%) because it contributed to both P1 and P2, whilst P3
(15%), P4 (13%) and P7 (16%) made lower but similar
contributions. The percentage contributions of P9, P10 and P11
were 6.4%, 6.5% and 3.6%, respectively. The countries with high
risk tended to have higher risk scores for outbound (P3) and
inbound tourism (P4), number of residents from ASF-affected
countries (P5/P8) and number of ports and airports (P9). Details of
the MS risk scores for all release proxy indicators are shown in
Table S3.
Figure 4 shows the overall exposure risk scores obtained. No
country fell into the very high risk category, but five countries
(France, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain) had high risk of
exposure and ten countries were in the moderate risk category
(Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Portugal, Sweden and UK). Cyprus and Luxembourg had
a negligible risk, and Belgium, Denmark, Malta, The Netherlands
and Slovenia had a very low risk. Romania and Poland had high
risk scores for the number of non-high-biosecurity farms (5 and 4,
respectively). Estonia, Portugal and Spain had high scores for the
estimated number of workers in the livestock sector from ASF-
affected countries (5, 5 and 4, respectively). High scores for P14,
the area of country with both wild boar habitat and non-high-
biosecurity farms, were obtained for France, Spain and Sweden
(RS= 5), and Finland, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania and UK
(RS= 4). Details of the MS risk scores for all exposure proxy
indicators are shown in Table S4.
Figure 5 displays the combined overall release and exposure risk
scores of all EU MS, and their central 80% inter-percentile range
resulting from variation in the proxy indicators’ weights. Two
groups of countries have distinctively higher risk profiles: France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom had moderate to
high risk scores for both release and exposure assessments, and
Poland and Romania had low release risk scores but high exposure
risk scores. Varying the PIs’ weights resulted in changes of risk of
release and/or exposure for most MS, however the risk usually
changed by one category only and for a small proportion of
iterations (less than 25%), meaning that in the majority of cases
Figure 3. Results of the release assessment. Overall risk scores for the release of ASFV via illegal importation of pork and pork products into the
European Union member states.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.g003
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MS’ relative risks of release and exposure remained the same. The
release risk category increased within the central 50% inter-
percentile range for 7 MS (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Hungary,
Malta, Slovakia and the United Kingdom), while it decreased for
Cyprus, France, Poland and Romania. MS whose change in
exposure risk categories occurred within the central 50% inter-
percentile range are: the Czech Republic, Estonia and Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom. Details
of the association between PIs’ weights values and changes in MS
risk categories are shown in Tables S5, S6, and S7. Some PIs’
weights had little effect on the MS relative risks, affecting few MS
risk categories and only at extreme values, such as w3, w6, w8 and
w11. The PIs’ weights w2, w12 and w13 only had an impact on risk
scores at extreme values, but in that case they affected many MS
risk categories. Finally, the following PIs’ weights were found to
affect some MS risk categories even for values close to the mean of
the individual weights given by experts: w1, w4, w5, w7, w9, w10
and w14. The impact of the percentage of farms with non-high-
biosecurity used to calculate P12 and P14 on the overall exposure
risk category is shown in Figure 6. If there were no non-high-
biosecurity farms (0%) then all MS fell into the negligible or very
low risk category. If 50% of farms were non-high-biosecurity, then
the following countries moved down one risk category compared
to the original model: Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and UK. If 75%
of farms were non-high-biosecurity, then the results were the same
as the original model except that Latvia moved to the low risk
category. If all farms were non-high-biosecurity (100%) then again
the results were the same as the original model except that
Germany and Portugal moved from moderate to high risk.
Discussion
The semi-quantitative risk assessment model presented in this
paper constitutes an innovative approach for estimating the
relative risks of introduction of disease into countries through
illegal importation of meat and products. The framework de-
veloped is based on a systematic and transparent approach, and
makes use of available data for the 27 EU countries on factors
likely to influence this risk. The results provide an indication of the
likely level of the risk of introduction for countries considered, as
well as the main factors contributing to it. The visual represen-
tation of the release and exposure assessments further facilitates
the interpretation of the results. Another critical advantage of the
approach is the use of the same framework and sources of data for
all countries, allowing comparison of levels of risk between them.
Figure 4. Results of the exposure assessment. Overall risk scores for the exposure of the European Union member states if ASFV was released
through illegal importation of pork and pork products.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.g004
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Figure 5. Combined results of release and exposure assessments, and results of the sensitivity analysis on proxy indicators’
weights. Scatter plot of the overall release and exposure risk scores for the European Union member states, and the 80% central interquartile range
of risk scores resulting from varying proxy indicators’ weights. Abbreviations – AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic,
DK: Denmark, EE: Estonia, FI: Finland, FR: France, DE: Germany, EL: Greece, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, LV: Latvia, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg,
MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, RO: Romania, SK: Slovakia, SI: Slovenia, ES: Spain, SE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.g005
Figure 6. Results of the sensitivity analysis on proxy indicator P12 and P14. The overall exposure risk scores of the European Union
member states were assessed for different values of percentage of non-high-biosecurity farms. Figure 6 shows the results of the exposure assessment
for: a) original model, b) 0% non-high biosecurity farms, c) 25% non-high biosecurity farms, d) 50% non-high biosecurity farms, e) 75% non-high
biosecurity farms, f) 100% non-high biosecurity farms. The percentage of non-high-biosecurity farms was used to calculate two exposure risk scores:
RSP12 and RSP14.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061104.g006
ASFV Introduction into EU via Illegal Trade
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The model presented in this paper was developed for ASF but the
approach used can easily be adapted to other diseases and other
animal products.
Previous risk assessments investigating illegal importation of
meat and products were informed by expert opinion for both their
model structure and parameterisation, and the quantification of
illegal imports relied on data on custom seizures in the case of
country-specific studies [13–15]. The quantification of illegal
movements of animal products using custom seizures constituted
a challenge for these country-specific assessments, and it became
a major obstacle when trying to develop a risk assessment
framework suitable for all MS of the EU. Besides the fact that such
data are not collected consistently across MS, it was unsure
whether use of custom seizure data would have been allowed by all
customs authorities. A preliminary search conducted for a small
number of MS indicated that the protocols for search at customs
and the data recorded varied between countries, which would
have hampered comparisons between MS. Hence, a sensible
compromise was to estimate the importance of illegal imports
indirectly via factors likely to influence it (PIs), and for which data
was available at the EU level.
This work attempted to include the main socio-economic and
geographical factors known - or assumed – to influence illegal
importation of meat and products. Illegal imports of meat and
derived products occur either for personal consumption or for
commercial purposes, i.e. for re-sale after importation [15]. Data
on residents from ASF-affected countries was included to represent
potential demand for animal products from these areas, which
influence both the risk of smuggling for personal consumption or
for commercial purposes. This is supported by a study conducted
on agricultural smuggling in the United States of America (USA)
which found important illegal meat imports linked to the two main
foreign communities of USA immigrants: smuggling for personal
consumption of specialty meats from Mexico prior to holidays, and
smuggling from China for sales in ethnic food markets [31].
Tourism data to and from ASF-affected countries aimed at
capturing risky small-scale imports for personal consumption by
tourists carrying ASFV contaminated meat products in their
luggage. While a large proportion of such tourists may be unaware
of doing something illegal when importing meat products, some
people know the rules but still try to bring some animal products
(for example if they are considered a delicacy) into the country.
Information on banned and restricted goods is usually available on
posters at airports, ports and border inspection points. However,
a report from the European Commission [32] indicated that little
information is provided to travellers by international transport
operators and that a minority of MS offer information to travellers
on specific websites. Hence, passengers may not always have easy
access to such information, or may find it difficult to understand.
For example, an official MS webpage accessed in January 2012
[33] indicated that if travelling from another EU country it is
allowed to bring in ‘‘any meat, dairy or other animal products as
long as they are free from diseases and for your own consump-
tion’’. Most passengers are probably unaware of problematic
diseases and how to know if the products they are carrying are free
of them. Some may consider that if the products they carry are at
risk they would have been informed when purchasing them or
passengers may also be puzzled/misguided by products sold in
some airports and duty-free areas, although banned from bringing
to many regions. The EU is aware of the risk caused by personal
imports and the importance of communication to the public to
mitigate it, and has recently developed clearer rules for the public
and produced communication packages in 35 languages (Com-
mission Regulation (EC) No 206/2009) [34].
For the risk of illegal imports for commercial purpose, other
critical factors had to be accounted for. Smuggling needs to be
profitable and illegal imports usually concern animal products that
are expensive and/or difficult to find. This is illustrated by the case
of Norway, where high meat prices led to mass smuggling of
animal products, including pork [35]. In the risk assessment
model, the price of pork in each MS was used as a proxy for this
economic incentive: the higher the price in a MS, the more likely
the sales outweigh the cost of smuggling pork and pork products.
Illegal imports for commercial purposes are also conditional on
practical considerations: the easier it is to smuggle the products
into a country, the more likely it is to happen. In the case of illegal
imports of ASF-contaminated meat and products, the data used to
capture these constraints were the distance between EU MS and
ASF affected areas, and the number of entry points into a MS.
It was not possible to include data on custom seizures in the
model, but our findings were compared with those of a report from
the EU on illegal consignments of meat found in personal luggage
at EU entry points [32]. The report showed an increase in the
reported amounts of meat seizures in personal luggage between
2005 and 2007, with more than 200 tonnes confiscated and/or
destroyed in 2007. This might reflect an enhancement of search
methods at customs, but the figures also confirm the risk of
introduction of diseases into EU posed by illegal imports of animal
products. Between 2005 and 2007, the countries amongst the five
most frequently cited as the origin of seized personal consignments
of meat were China, Egypt, Russia, Turkey (for the 3 years),
Ukraine (2006 and 2007), Romania (2005), Thailand (2006) and
Serbia Montenegro (2007). Given the occurrence of ASF in Russia
and the first outbreak of ASF reported in Ukraine at the end of
July 2012, these findings highlight the importance of the results of
the present risk assessment. The results are also in agreement with
the conclusions of previous studies [16–19] that called attention to
the importance of illegal importation of pork and products in the
risk of introduction of ASF into the EU.
The EU report on illegal consignments [32] identified Spain,
UK, Germany and France as the countries with the largest
amounts of meat confiscated/destroyed from personal luggage,
while Italy was amongst the MS with intermediate reported
amounts of meat seizures in personal luggage. The results of the
release risk assessment are in agreement with the EU report, as the
5 MS with moderate or high relative risks of release correspond to
countries reporting large amounts of meat seizures. Differences in
protocols for detection of illegal importation and/or in data
reported to the EU might have contributed to the observed
difference of ranking between the EU report and the model results
for Italy and Spain. Also, the EU report only included illegal
consignments in personal luggage and the observed difference
might be explained at least partially by illegal imports for
commercial purposes. Indeed, Italy had higher scores than Spain
for all PIs influencing the risk of release via importations of pork
and pork products for commercial purposes.
Freedom of trade within the EU means that it is possible for
illegal animal products to enter through one MS and then be
transported to another, most likely for commercial reasons than
personal consumption. A possible scenario is that the animal
product is imported to a MS for geographical reasons (e.g.
proximity to an infected country, many ports and airports or less
controlled border points with non-EU countries) in order to then
be transported within the EU to meet high demand in a nearby
MS (e.g. countries where the animal products of interest are very
expensive). This scenario has not explicitly been addressed in our
model. However, the results provide an indication of whether and
how this could happen. In the case of ASF introduction through
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illegal imports of pork and products, the countries that could be
initial points of introduction are those with high or very high
scores on geographical parameters (P9–P11): Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Sweden and UK. No specific MS had high RS for
the combined demand parameters ‘number of residents from ASF-
affected countries’ and ‘price of pork’. A spatio-temporal model for
ASF spread in EU recently developed also provides insights on this
issue [36].
A majority of MS had high or moderate relative risks of
exposure of the domestic pig population if ASF were released.
These MS had a moderate to very high risk score for the area of
country with both wild boar habitat and non-high-biosecurity
(P14), which was the PI with the highest contribution to the
exposure risk score. P14 assumes that in areas with non-high-
biosecurity farms and wild boar, contact can occur between pigs
and wild boar, resulting in exposure to ASF if wild boar were to
become infected with ASF or act as fomites. Unless the
questionnaire respondents had indicated complete absence of pigs
or only high biosecurity pigs in specified areas then it was assumed
that all areas with wild boar habitat also had non-high-biosecurity
pigs. As only Finland, Germany and Denmark reported areas with
no non-high-biosecurity farms, this may overall have resulted in an
overestimation of the risk. Also, this resulted in MS risk scores for
P14 being mainly driven by the area of the country with wild boar
habitat suitability, hence the high risk scores for MS with large
areas of potential wild boar habitat. The wild boar habitat
suitability was derived from the first analysis of the distribution of
the wild boar in the Iberian Peninsula [25]: the same methodology
was applied across the EU to generate a distribution map allowing
comparison between countries. The lack of detailed national data
on both wild boar and non-high-biosecurity farms however makes
more precise estimation of the areas of interface between non-
high-biosecurity farms and wild boar difficult, and represents an
important limitation of this study.
The five countries assessed at highest risk of exposure had
different profiles: the risk for France and Italy was mainly due to
the countries’ large areas of wild boar habitat. In addition to the
large area of the countries with both non-high-biosecurity farms
and wild boar habitat, Romania and Poland had a very large
proportion of pig farms falling in the non-high-biosecurity
category (i.e. holdings with less than 100 breeding sows and/or
less than 400 other pigs greater than 20 kg) and hence at higher
risk of swill feeding, contact with fomites and access to waste or
landfill, all known to be mechanisms of transmission of ASF. In
addition to large areas with wild boar habitat, Spain had a large
estimated number of pig farm workers from ASF-affected
countries (P13). P13 assumes that foreign pig farm workers are
more likely to consume meat products from their countries of
origin, imported illegally, that these products may be contami-
nated with ASF, and that farm workers can infect pigs either by
acting as fomites or by feeding swill to pigs. In the case of Spain,
pig farmers are likely to be aware of the risk of ASF introduction
and thus swill feeding is less likely to occur compared to other
countries with no history of ASF. While this model clearly
highlights areas that are potentially of concern, country specific
risk assessments are needed to confirm or clarify threats identified
in the generic model.
As with any model, the results of the present risk assessment
were influenced by the quality of the input data. Good data for all
MS were available for most of the PIs included in the model.
However, the data available and/or their quality were limited for
some PIs of the exposure assessment, such as the number of non-
high-biosecurity farms. A consultation of Chief Veterinary Officers
from a number of MS indicated that the different levels of
biosecurity as defined by EFSA [16] were interpreted differently,
which prevented the use of questionnaire data for this PI. Instead
farm size was used as a proxy for the level of biosecurity and the
generated estimates were associated with a high level of un-
certainty, as they did not account for differences in pig farming
systems between MS and the fact that farm size and biosecurity
level are not directly correlated [28]. The sensitivity analysis
performed was useful to understand the impact of this PI on the
overall exposure RS. Thanks to the systematic structure of the
approach used, re-assessing the risk of introduction of ASF into
EU MS through illegal importation of pork and products is easily
possible as soon as more data becomes available for the model
parameterisation. If ASF were to further spread and persist in
Ukraine, the model parameters could be updated to account for
the country status. The following data would have to be added to
the current model: outbound and inbound tourism to Ukraine
(data on the Ukrainian official statistics website), residents of
Ukraine in MS (data in Eurostat), and distance to nearest ASF-
infected countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania
would then have very high risk score for this PI).
The sensitivity analysis carried out on on parameters with high
uncertainty showed their impact on the risk assessment, and the
sensitivity analysis performed on PIs’ weights provided a measure
of the uncertainty in the model outputs associated to the
uncertainty in the relative importance of the PIs. Overall the
sensitivity analysis suggested that the model is reasonably robust as
no major changes of risk levels were observed and most changes in
risk categories occurred for extreme values of PIs’ weights. Model
validation is also important, although difficult to perform as no
estimates of the magnitude of meat smuggling into the EU were
available. The previous comparison of the MS release risks with
the reported seizures of meat products in personal luggage at EU
entry points [34] suggested that the model performed well,
identifying the same MS at higher risk. In addition, this risk
assessment was compared with studies investigating ASF in-
troduction into Finland [37], UK [15,38], Poland [39] and
Denmark [40]. Quinn [39] estimated the risk of ASF release via
illegal imports to be medium for Poland, while the overall release
score obtained in this study was low. Quinn considered the
existence of an illegal market for pork products from ASF-infected
areas to be highly unlikely, which agrees with the present risk
assessment. However, Quinn considered the probability of release
due to legal or illegal immigrants from Russia and Transcaucasia
carrying pork products for personal consumption to be medium,
whilst the current risk assessment estimated the risk for importa-
tion for personal consumption to be very low. A study on
smuggling at the Polish-Ukrainian border suggests that meat
smuggling is probably limited and is more likely to be from Poland
to Ukraine [41], and thus supports the findings of the present
study. In the risk assessment by Brown [40] the probability of
release of ASF into Denmark via illegal pork imports was
estimated to be negligible based on previous findings [13], while
it was estimated to be very low in the current study. In this work,
the risk scores for Denmark were negligible or very low for all
parameters except ‘distance to nearest ASF-infected country’ and
‘number of ports and airports’ for which medium risk scores were
obtained. In a recent qualitative risk assessment for the risk of
introduction of ASF into the UK domestic population from
endemic regions during 2012, Brand [38] estimated the risk of
release via illegal imports to be moderate on a scale of four risk
categories (negligible, low, moderate, high). This compares well
with the current release assessment in which UK had a high
release risk score. In contrast, a quantitative risk assessment for
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Great Britain [15] estimated a negligible or very low risk of illegal
imports of ASF-contaminated meat (46 g, range= 7–138 g).
However, Wooldridge’s assessment pre-dated the introduction of
ASF into Russia and Transcaucasia, so their results are not
comparable with the results of this work. The aforementioned risk
assessments did not meaningfully differ from the findings obtained
in this study by considering factors that are most likely linked with
illegal importation. This supports our risk assessment results which
indicated that overall there is an important risk of introduction of
ASF into the EU through illegal importation of pork and pork
products.
In conclusion, this paper presented an innovative semi-
quantitative risk assessment model for the introduction of diseases
through illegal importation of meat and derived products. The
model shows that the overall risk of ASF introduction into EU via
such illegal importation is not negligible. The results stress the
importance of the enforcement of the restrictions on the
introduction of personal consignments of meat products at EU
entry points, and of good farm biosecurity including the respect of
ban on swill feeding. Risk assessment models for disease
introduction into the EU would benefit from the harmonisation
of data collection for compilation in databases such as Eurostat.
The study also highlighted the need for a common definition of
biosecurity levels and categorisation of pig farming systems
accordingly across EU MS.
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